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NOTES
CUYLER ,. SULLIV4N AND PROPOSED RULE
44(c): CONTRASTING APPROACHES TO
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN MULTIPLE
REPRESENTATION OF CRIMINAL
DEFENDANTS
Multiple representation' occurs when one attorney or law firm - either
retained or court-appointed - represents two or more codefendants. Un-
less the interests of the codefendants are identical, this situation can pro-
duce an array of conflict-of-interest problems for the lawyer or firm.2
Clients with divergent defenses, for example, may confront counsel with
the dilemma of having to refrain from advancing an argument for one
1. Two examples of circumstances in which multiple representation may occur - and
thus the potential for conflict of interest - are these:
A doctor and his receptionist, a college student, are charged with illegally dispensing diet
pills. The doctor offers to share with the receptionist the services of an attorney he has
retained. The receptionist agrees because he does not have much money. An attorney rep-
resenting the receptionist alone might argue that his client knew nothing of the crime and
that only the doctor is culpable. This attorney might advise the receptionist to testify against
the doctor in exchange for immunity or a reduced charge. An attorney representing both
defendants, however, could not suggest these defenses for the receptionist because of their
adverse effect upon the interests of his other client, the doctor. Consequently, the jointly
represented receptionist might never learn of these alternatives.
Similar potential for conflict exists when a corporate executive and lower echelon employ-
ees are charged with the same crime, and the corporation hires one attorney or firm to repre-
sent both the executive and the employees. The employees, fearing reprisals, might be
hesitant to secure separate representation. Consequently, the employees may not be advised
of their option to testify for the prosecution in return for a reduced charge or even immunity.
The executive, possibly the real target of the prosecution, would have a strong interest in
maintaining a solid front against the prosecution. Again the attorney confronts incompati-
ble interests.
The terms "multiple representation" and "joint representation" will be used interchange-
ably to refer to situations in which two or more defendants in a criminal case are represented
by a single attorney or firm. Although multiple representation and the potential for conflict
occur in civil as well as criminal contexts, this Note will deal exclusively with the criminal
context.
2. THE ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, addressing possible conflicts,
cites the explanation given in the ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS No. 6, adopted
by the American Bar Association on January 7, 1938: "A lawyer represents conflicting inter-
ests when, in behalf of one client, it is his duty to contend for that which duty to another
client requires him to oppose." ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-15 n.19
(1978).
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defendant lest the other be inculpated. Moreover, even if codefendants'
interests are identical at trial, those interests may diverge at a sentencing
hearing. Ordinarily, counsel might attempt to mitigate the severity of one
defendant's sentence by arguing that the other defendant either committed
the more serious acts or incited the criminal conduct of his fundamentally
law-abiding codefendant.3 An attorney representing both defendants,
however, would be unable to present either of these arguments for one
client without injuring the interest of his other client. Thus, defendants
sharing counsel may receive ineffective representation at some or all stages
of the proceedings.
Prior to 1980, the Supreme Court had dealt only twice with the issue of
ineffective assistance of counsel arising from multiple representation.4 In
both cases the trial court had, in effect, forced multiple representation on
codefendants over the objection of counsel. Each trial resulted in a convic-
tion that was subsequently reversed on appeal. Neither case, however, ad-
dressed the common situation in which the possibility of conflict is not
raised at trial, but the defendant claims on appeal that he was denied effec-
tive assistance of counsel because of such a conflict of interest. As a result,
lower courts continued to disagree over whether in all cases of joint repre-
sentation a trial judge had an affirmative duty to inquire whether defend-
ants were being denied effective assistance of counsel due to a conflict of
3. See People v. Chacon, 69 Cal. 2d 765, 775, 447 P.2d 106, 112, 73 Cal. Rptr. 10, 16
(1968), in which joint representation during death penalty sentencing proceedings was com-
mented on by Justice Traynor:
Often the strongest argument that separate counsel can make on the issue of
penalty is that his client was less culpable than the others and that he, at least,
should not be executed. . . . Counsel representing more than one defendant is
necessarily inhibited in making such arguments and in presenting evidence to sup-
port them. He cannot simultaneously argue with any semblance of effectiveness
that each defendant is most deserving of the lesser penalty.
4. See Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S.
60 (1942).
As this Note will explain, the Court in Cuyler v. Sullivan, 100 S. Ct. 1708 (1980), deline-
ated the showing required of a defendant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel as a
result of a conflict of interest in joint representation.
But the Court still has not determined what satisfies the sixth amendment requirement of
effective assistance of counsel for a criminal defendant when no conflict of interest is alleged.
See, e.g., Maryland v. Marzullo, 435 U.S. 1011, 1011 (1978) (White, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari) ("Despite the clear significance of this question, the Federal Courts of
Appeal are in disarray.") Compare United States v. Madrid Ramirez, 535 F.2d 125, 129 (ist
Cir. 1976) (representation deemed adequate unless it was "such as to make a mockery, a
sham or farce of the trial") with Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730, 736 (3d Cir. 1970)
(effective representation is "the exercise of the customary skill and knowledge which nor-
mally prevails at the time and place").
[Vol. 30:103
Multiple Representation
interest.5 Courts also differed on the requisite degree of conflict necessary
to constitute denial of effective representation.6
In Cuyler v. Sullivan,' the Supreme Court addressed these questions and
concluded that there was no constitutional basis for requiring trial judges
in state courts to inquire into the propriety of every case of multiple repre-
sentation.8 The Court endorsed such a requirement for federal courts,
however, by promulgating Rule 44(c), a proposed amendment to the Fed-
eral Rules of Criminal Procedure.9 In addition to examining the Sullivan
decision and its impact on multiple representation, this Note will demon-
strate why an inquiry such as that mandated by Rule 44(c) is the prefera-
ble solution to the problems inherent in multiple representation in all
criminal trials - state as well as federal.
I. THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
A. The Right to Counsel in Federal Courts
Although the sixth amendment is customarily thought to express the his-
torical right to counsel, under English common law a defendant was not
permitted representation by an attorney in felony trials until 1836. 1 Some
5. Compare United States v. Foster, 469 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1972) (district courts must
conduct inquiries into the risks of multiple representation of jointly-represented defendants)
with Mesch v. United States, 407 F.2d 1290 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 826 (1969)
("procedural fact" that the trial court failed to make inquiry is not determinative without a
showing of prejudice).
6. Compare United States v. Partin, 601 F.2d 1000, 1009 (9th Cir. 1979) (defendant
must show specific prejudice caused by the alleged conflict of interest) with Walker v.
United States, 422 F.2d 374, 375 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 915 (1970) (defendant must
show a possible conflict of interest or prejudice, however remote).
7. 100 S. Ct. 1708 (1980).
8. Id at 1717. Some commentators, however, had recommended aperse rule prohib-
iting multiple representation in criminal cases. See Geer, Representation of Multiple Crimi-
nal Defendants: Conflicts of Interest and the Professional Responsibilities of the Defense
Attorney, 62 MINN. L. REV. 119, 157-62 (1978); Lowenthal, Joint Representation in Criminal
Cases.- A Critical Appraisal, 64 VA. L. REV. 939, 980-89 (1978); Wanat, Conflicts of Interest in
Criminal Cases and the Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel - the Need for Change, 10
RUT.-CAM. L.J. 57, 85-88 (1978). The Court in Sullivan rejected such aperse rule as well as
a constitutionally mandated inquiry. 100 S. Ct. at 1717.
9. See 100 S. Ct. at 1717 n.10. Rule 44(c), scheduled to take effect December 1, 1980,
requires federal court judges to inquire into potential conflicts of interest in multiple repre-
sentation cases and advise defendants of their right to separate counsel. After discussing
proposed Rule 44(c) and citing circuits which require similar inquiries, the Court concluded:
"As our promulgation of Rule 44(c) suggests, we view such an exercise of the supervisory
power as a desirable practice." For a discussion of Rule 44(c), see notes 94-102 and accom-
panying text infra.
10. Holtzoff, The Right of Counsel Under the Sixth Amendment, 20 N.Y.U.L.Q. REV. 1,
6 (1944) [hereinafter cited as HoltzoffJ.
1980]
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commentators contend that the sixth amendment was not originally in-
tended to afford an unqualified right to counsel. Rather, they argue, the
intention of the amendment was to assure a defendant the right to be rep-
resented at trial only if he were able to retain an attorney.'' Consequently,
with the exception of capital cases where the trial judge was directed by
statute to appoint counsel,' 2 there existed no right to counsel in cases in-
volving lesser crimes.
In 1938, however, the Supreme Court began to extend the right to ap-
pointed representation for indigent defendants. In Johnson v. Zerbst,'3 the
Court overturned a decision in which codefendants charged with uttering
counterfeit currency were denied their request for appointed counsel. The
Court held that the sixth amendment requires the appointment of counsel
to represent indigent defendants in all federal cases where life or liberty is
at stake. 4 This requirement was later broadened in Walker v. Johnson'5
to include the opportunity for a defendant without financial means to con-
sult with an appointed attorney before entering a plea of guilty at trial. In
Walker, the defendant pleaded guilty to armed robbery without having
been apprised of his right to an attorney. The Court held that the defend-
ant had not voluntarily waived his right to counsel and had, in fact, been
deprived of his sixth amendment rights.' 6
The principles set forth by the Court in Zerbst, Walker, and later in
11. See Allen, The Supreme Court, Federalism and Slate Systems of Criminal Justice, 8
DEPAUL L. REV. 213, 224 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Allen]; Holtzoff, supra note 10, at 7-8.
In support of this contention, Holtzoff noted that after proposing the first 10 amendments to
the Constitution in 1789, Congress passed a law in 1790, presently codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 3005 (1948), requiring the appointment of counsel in capital cases. Holtzoff reasons that if
the appointment of counsel was required by the sixth amendment, there would have been no
reason for the law to have been proposed or passed.
12. 18 U.S.C. § 3005 (1948), provides:
Whoever is indicted for treason or other capital crime shall be allowed to make his
full defense by counsel learned in the law; and the court before which he is tried, or
some judge thereof, shall immediately, upon his request, assign to him such coun-
sel, not exceeding two, as he may desire, who shall have free access to him at all
reasonable hours.
13. 304 U.S. 458 (1938). In a South Carolina federal district court, Johnson and a code-
fendant were charged with possessing and passing counterfeit money. Their request for
counsel having been denied, they conducted their own defense. They were convicted and
sentenced to four and one-half years in prison. On appeal the Supreme Court stated: "the
Sixth Amendment withholds from federal courts, in all criminal proceedings, the power and
authority to deprive an accused of his life or liberty unless he has or waives the assistance of
counsel." Id. at 463.
14. id.
15. 312 U.S. 275 (1941).
16. Id at 286.
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Glasser v. United States,'7 were finally codified in 1946 in Rule 44 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. This rule mandates the assignment
of counsel to indigents in all federal criminal prosecutions unless the de-
fendant expressly waives his right to such assistance. 8
B. The Right to Counsel in State Courts
The development of the right-to-counsel doctrine in state courts resulted
from the extension of sixth amendment principles to state cases. In Powell
v. Alabama,'9 seven indigent black youths from another state were tried
and convicted in Alabama for the rape of two white girls, a capital offense.
Six days prior to trial, the entire county bar was appointed to defend the
accused. On review, the Supreme Court held that the trial court's failure
to make effective appointment of counsel in a capital case, where the de-
fendants were young, illiterate, and besieged by hostile sentiment, consti-
tuted a denial of due process and required reversal of the conviction.2"
Subsequently, however, in Betts v. Brady,2 the Court refused to extend the
right to appointed counsel to defendants accused of noncapital crimes. In
Betts, the Court found no reversible error where an indigent defendant
charged with robbery in Maryland was denied his request for appointed
counsel.
In Gideon v. Wainwright,22 however, the Court reconsidered this ques-
tion. An indigent defendant in a Florida court was charged with breaking
and entering with intent to commit a misdemeanor, a felony under Florida
law. The defendant requested and was denied the appointment of an at-
torney. The Court overruled Betts and reversed the conviction, thus ex-
tending the rationale of Powell to noncapital cases in state courts. In so
doing, the Court found that the right to counsel guaranteed by the sixth
amendment was a fundamental right that applied to the states through the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 23 A steady stream of
17. 315 U.S. 60 (1942). See notes 25-28 and accompanying text infra.
18. FED. R. CRIM. P. 44. Rule 44(a) provides: "Right to Assigned Counsel. Every
defendant who is unable to obtain counsel shall be entitled to have counsel assigned to
represent him at every stage of the proceedings from his initial appearance before the federal
magistrate or the court through appeal, unless he waives such appointment." The original
advisory committee note adds that the rule is a restatement of the principles declared by the
Supreme Court in Zerbst, Johnston, and Glasser. See notes 13-17 and accompanying text
.upra.
19. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
20. Id Significantly, Powell also marked one of the first ventures by the Supreme
Court into the area of state criminal procedures. See Allen, supra note 11, at 215.
21. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
22. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
23. Id. at 341-44. The Court declared:
19801
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decisions followed which created an absolute right to counsel in criminal
cases where imprisonment could result.24 Left unaddressed was the ques-
tion of how much that right might be diluted by the existence of a conflict
of interest as a result of multiple representation.
C. Conflict of Interest." A Constitutional Right Imperiled
The Supreme Court first addressed the problem of conflict of interest in
joint representation cases in Glasser v. United States, 5 declaring that the
"'assistance of counsel' guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment contemplates
that such assistance be untrammeled and unimpaired by a court order re-
quiring that one lawyer shall simultaneously represent conflicting inter-
ests." 6 At trial, the judge had required Glasser's attorney, over the
objection of both counsel and client, to represent one of Glasser's code-
fendants who had discharged his own attorney. The Supreme Court found
that the trial court thereby denied Glasser his right to effective assistance
of counsel27 and concluded that a trial judge has "the duty of seeing that
the trial is conducted with solicitude for the essential rights of the ac-
cused. . . . The trial court should protect the right of an accused to have
We accept . . . that a provision of the Bill of Rights which is "fundamental and
essential to a fair trial" is made obligatory upon the States by the Fourteenth
Amendment .... The right of one charged with crime to counsel may not be
deemed fundamental and essential to fair trials in some countries, but it is in ours.
From the very beginning our state and national constitutions and laws have laid
great emphasis on procedural and substantive safeguards designed to assure fair
trials.
Id at 342-44.
24. The Court later limited the absolute right to counsel to felony cases. See Mempa v,
Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 134 (1967). But this restriction was eliminated in Argersinger v. Ham-
lin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972), where the Court held that "absent a knowing and intelligent waiver,
no person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or
felony, unless he was represented by counsel at his trial." Id at 37 (footnote omitted).
25. 315 U.S. 60 (1942). In Glasser the defendant, a government prosecutor, was accused
of conspiracy to defraud the United States for accepting bribes in exchange for not prosecut-
ing those charged with making illegal whiskey. Id at 64.
26. Id. at 70.
27. Id at 76. In a vigorous dissent, however, Justice Frankfurter criticized this finding:
[Tihe perspective of the living trial is lost in the search for error in a dead record.
To set aside the conviction of Glasser (a lawyer who served as an Assistant United
States Attorney for more than four years) . . . on the grounds that he was denied
• . . "'the assistance of counsel'" . .. , is to give fresh point to this regrettably
familiar phenomenon. For Glasser himself made no such claim at any of the criti-
cal occasions throughout the proceedings . . . . Not until . . . fifteen weeks after
the trial had ended, did Glasser discover that he had been deprived of his constitu-
tional rights. This was obviously a lawyer's afterthought.
Id at 88-89 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 30:103
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the assistance of counsel."28
The Court reaffirmed and extended Glasser in Holloway P. 4rkansas.2 9
In that case, the trial court had appointed a single attorney to represent
three codefendants charged with robbery and rape. The attorney re-
quested appointment of separate counsel in two pretrial motions stating
that conflicting interests among the codefendants prevented him from pro-
viding effective assistance to each. The trial court denied both motions
without inquiry.3" The Supreme Court concluded that Glasser required
automatic reversal "whenever the trial court improperly requires joint rep-
resentation over timely objection."'"
The Holloway Court specifically reserved judgment, however, on two
issues which arise when the possibility of conflicting interests is not raised
at trial. First, the Supreme Court declined to rule on whether a trial court
has an affirmative duty to inquire into all cases of joint representation to
determine if an actual or possible conflict will deprive the defendant of his
right to effective assistance of counsel. Second, the Court left undefined
the degree of conflict that must be shown before a reviewing court should
conclude that a defendant was denied his right to effective representa-
tion. 3' As a result of the Court's silence, the various federal circuit courts
were divided on the question of whether a district court judge must inquire
into the possibility of conflict in all cases of joint representation. Five cir-
cuits required an inquiry by the trial court, 33 but only the Second Circuit
found the inquiry constitutionally mandated and enforceable in state
28. Id at 71. See note 81 and accompanying text infra.
29. 435 U.S. 475 (1978).
30. Id at 477.
31. Id at 488.
32. Id at 483-84. The Court noted that the various appellate courts had arrived at
conflicting answers to these questions. On the issue of a duty to inquire compare United
States v. Mandell, 525 F.2d 671, 677 (7th Cir. 1975) (defense counsel has responsibility to
apprise accused of potential dangers of multiple representation) with United States v. De-
Berry, 487 F.2d 448, 452-53 (2d Cir. 1973) (district courts must conduct a careful inquiry
into joint representation of defendants). Regarding the requisite showing of conflict re-
quired for reversal compare Walker v. United States, 422 F.2d 374, 375 (3d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 399 U.S. 915 (1970) (defendant must show a possible conflict of interest or prejudice,
however remote, before a reviewing court may find joint representation constitutionally de-
fective) with United States v. Atkinson, 565 F.2d 1283, 1284 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436
U.S. 944 (1978) (defendant must show some "specific instance of prejudice, some real con-
flict of interest" (quoting United States v. Lovano, 420 F.2d 769, 772 (2d Cir. 1970)) resulting
from the joint representation).
33. The First, Second, Eighth, Ninth, and District of Columbia Circuits required an
inquiry by the district court in all cases of joint representation. United States v. Eaglin, 571
F.2d 1069, 1086 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 906 (1978); United States v. DeBerry,
487 F.2d 448, 452-53 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v. Foster, 469 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1972);
United States v. Williams, 429 F.2d 158, 161 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 947 (1970);
1980]
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courts. 34 Of the six remaining circuits, at least two found such an inquiry
"suggested"35 or "advisable. '36 The District of Columbia Circuit adopted
a unique rule requiring separate counsel to be appointed initially for each
defendant in all cases where appointment of counsel is appropriate.37
Among the states, only one38 required an inquiry by the trial court into all
cases of joint representation; four other states strongly suggested such an
inquiry.39
There was substantially less disagreement among lower courts on the
requisite showing of conflict necessary before relief would be granted for
ineffective assistance of counsel. A majority of the circuits and states re-
quired that a defendant show some actual conflict of interest.40 Two cir-
cuits required a stronger showing of actual prejudice rather than the mere
Lollar v. United States, 376 F.2d 243, 245 (D.C. Cir. 1967). See Brief for Petitioner at 48-62,
Cuyler v. Sullivan, 100 S. Ct. 1708 (1980).
34. Colon v. Fogg, 603 F.2d 403, 407 (2d Cir. 1979). In this case the defendants were
convicted in state court of possession and sale of cocaine and sought habeas corpus relief in
federal court. The Second Circuit concluded that, absent an inquiry by the trial court, the
burden shifts to the state to prove that defendants were not prejudiced by the joint represen-
tation. Id. Rather than requiring an inquiry to be the mere exercise of a supervisory power,
as the other circuits had, the court held that "if defendants' Sixth Amendment right is to be
effective, such a course is dictated as a corollary of his constitutional right." Id Thus, the
constitutionally required duty applied with equal force to state and federal courts.
35. United States ex. rel. Hart v. Davenport, 478 F.2d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 1973) (inquiry is
the suggested procedure in cases of multiple representation).
36. United States v. Atkinson, 565 F.2d 1283, 1284 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S.
944 (1978) (inquiry, although not necessary, may be advisable, especially in cases of ap-
pointed counsel).
37. Ford v. United States, 379 F.2d 123, 125-26 (D.C. Cir. 1967). In this case the court
adopted a rule requiring that separate counsel be appointed initially in every case (of court-
appointed counsel), with the instruction that if counsel determines after investigation that
the defendant will be best served by joint representation, he should relay his conclusion and
reasons to the court for action.
38. People v. Gomberg, 38 N.Y.2d 307, 342 N.E.2d 550, 379 N.Y.S.2d 769 (1975) (court
must conduct an inquiry, but must be careful not to infringe defendant's right to retain
counsel of his own choice).
39. See Moreau v. State, 588 P.2d 275 (Alaska 1978) (absent a satisfactory inquiry,
burden shifts to the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that prejudicial conflict did not
exist); Commonwealth v. Davis, 384 N.E.2d 181 (Mass. 1978) (absent a satisfactory inquiry,
no automatic reversal, but state must show by a preponderance of the evidence that
prejudice to the defendant was improbable); State v. Olsen, 258 N.W.2d 898 (Minn. 1977)
(when no satisfactory inquiry appears on the record, burden shifts to the state to demon-
strate beyond a reasonable doubt that a prejudicial conflict of interest did not exist); State v.
Land, 73 N.J. 24, 372 A.2d 297 (1977) (absent an inquiry and waiver, where a potential
conflict of interest exists, prejudice will be presumed).
40. See United States v. Cox, 580 F.2d 317 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1075
(1979); United States v. Atkinson, 565 F.2d 1283 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 944
(1978); United States v. Woods, 544 F.2d 242 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 969
(1977); United States v. Mandell, 525 F.2d 671 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1049
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existence of a conflict of interest.4 Interestingly, both circuits only re-
quired this showing if an inquiry had been made initially by the trial court
into the propriety of joint representation.4 2 The Third Circuit, which had
no inquiry requirement, would grant relief so long as there was "some
showing of a possible conflict of interest or prejudice, however remote."4 3
Such a criterion would seem to require reversal if there was any possibility
of a conflict of interest in the representation. In Cuy/er v. Sullivan, the
Supreme Court eliminated the divergence of views on both issues.
II. Cuy/er v. Sullivan - Limits on the Constitutional Right to Counsel
Only two years after reserving judgment on the issues of the duty to
inquire and the requisite degree of conflict, the Supreme Court confronted
them in Cuyler v. Sullivan.' In that case, Sullivan sought a writ of habeas
(1976); Foxworth v. Wainwright, 516 F.2d 1072 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. Foster, 469
F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1972).
Twenty-six states require a showing of actual conflict of interest. See State v. Davis, 110
Ariz. 29, 514 P.2d 1025 (1973); Holloway v. State, 260 Ark. 250, 539 S.W.2d 435 (1976),
rev'd, 435 U.S. 475 (1978); People v. Romero, 189 Colo. 526, 543 P.2d 56 (1975); State v.
Marion, 175 Conn. 211, 397 A.2d 533 (1978); Hill v. State, 316 A.2d 557 (Del. 1974); Belton
v. State, 217 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 915 (1969); Munford v. Seavy, 241
Ga. 223, 244 S.E.2d 857 (1978); State v. Oldham, 92 Idaho 124, 438 P.2d 275 (1968); People
v. Vriner, 74 Ill. App. 3d 329, 385 N.E.2d 671 (1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 929 (1979);
Patterson v. State, 386 N.E.2d 936 (Ind. 1979); Jackson v. Auger, 239 N.W.2d 180 (Iowa
1976); State ex re. Thompson v. Henderson, 306 So. 2d 713 (La. 1975); Pressley v. State, 220
Md. 558, 155 A.2d 494 (1959); Commonwealth v. Soffen, 386 N.E.2d 1030 (Mass. 1979);
Irving v. State, 361 So. 2d 1360 (Miss. 1978); Mason v. State, 468 S.W.2d 617 (Mo. 1971);
State v. Henry, 582 P.2d 321 (Mont. 1978); People v. Gomberg, 38 N.Y.2d 307, 342 N.E.2d
550, 379 N.Y.S.2d 769 (1975); State v. Engle, 5 N.C. App. 101,167 S.E.2d 864 (1969); Wright
v. State, 505 P.2d 507 (Okla. Crim. App. 1973); Commonwealth v. Breaker, 456 Pa. 341, 318
A.2d 354 (1974); State v. Means, 268 N.W.2d 802 (S.D. 1978); Stutes v. State, 530 S.W.2d
309 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975); State v. Myers, 86 Wash. 2d 419, 545 P.2d 538 (1976); State ex
re. Postelwaite v. Bechtold, 212 S.E.2d 69 (W. Va. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 909 (1976);
State v. Medrano, 84 Wis. 2d 11, 267 N.W.2d 586 (1978).
41. United States v. Partin, 601 F.2d 1000, 1009 (9th Cir. 1979) (defendant must show
that some specific prejudice has resulted from the alleged conflict or interest); United States
v. Lovano, 420 F.2d 769, 773 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1071 (1970) ("some specific
instance of prejudice" must be shown).
42. United States v. Eaglin, 571 F.2d 1069, 1086 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S.
906 (1978) (the court will reject a challenge on the grounds of joint representation only if the
trial court made a satisfactory inquiry); United States v. Carrigan, 543 F.2d 1053, 1056 (2d
Cir. 1976) (absent an inquiry on the record the burden of proof shifts to the government to
establish "lack of prejudice").
43. Walker v. United States, 422 F.2d 374, 375 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 915
(1970) (representation of codefendants by the same attorney is not tantamount to denial of
effective assistance of counsel; there must be some showing of a possible conflict - affirmed
because no trace of such a conflict or prejudice was apparent).
44. 100 S. Ct. 1708 (1980). The Supreme Court granted certiorari, 444 U.S. 823 (1979),
1980]
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corpus, asserting as grounds for relief the ineffective assistance of counsel
arising from joint representation in his state court conviction. At trial, Sul-
livan had not objected to sharing counsel with his codefendants.
Sullivan and two other defendants were charged in state court with first
degree murder resulting from the shooting death of a union official and his
companion. Sullivan's codefendants jointly retained two prominent crimi-
nal attorneys. Sullivan retained a different attorney for a preliminary
hearing but, having no money, accepted his codefendants' offer to share
their counsel at trial.4" A state motion for severance was granted and Sul-
livan was tried first. His counsel made a tactical decision to rest their de-
fense at the conclusion of the prosecution's case without allowing Sullivan
to testify or to present evidence on his own behalf.46 Sullivan was con-
victed of both murders by a jury. Both of Sullivan's codefendants were
subsequently acquitted in separate jury trials.47
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed Sullivan's conviction after a
three-three split over the sufficiency of the evidence.48 After petitioning
unsuccessfully for habeas corpus relief in federal court,49 Sullivan sought
collateral relief in state court alleging, among other things, ineffective
assistance of counsel.5" At a hearing during these proceedings, one of Sul-
"to consider recurring issues left unresolved by Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978)."
Cuyler v. Sullivan, 100 S. Ct. at 1714.
45. United States exrel. Sullivan v. Cuyler, 593 F.2d 512, 518 n.7 (3d Cir. 1979). "Ap-
parently, friends of the defendants raised money from contributions . . . holding a lottery.
What other sources of funds there may have been remains unclear," the court said. The
record showed that no payment was made by Sullivan or his family to these attorneys.
46. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 100 S. Ct. at 1712.
47. United States ex re. Sullivan v. Cuyler, 593 F.2d at 515.
48. Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 446 Pa. 419, 286 A.2d 898 (1971). While conceding that
a conviction may be based entirely on circumstantial evidence, Justice Roberts (dissenting)
found the evidence in Sullivan's case "completely insufficient to support a conviction" and
summarized it as follows:
Sullivan was one of five or six people in the building at the time of the killing, that
a few minutes before the killing appellant had asked a janitor to leave a conference
[room] until after a "meeting" and finally that appellant had misstated his identity
to a telephone caller shortly before the killings.
446 Pa. at 442, 286 A.2d at 907 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
49. United States ex re. Sullivan v. Cuyler, 593 F.2d 512, 515 (3d Cir. 1979).
50. In 1974, Sullivan filed a petition for postconviction relief under the Pennsylvania
Post-Conviction Hearing Act (PCHA), 19 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1180.1-1180.14 (1966) (current
version at PA. R. CRIM P. §§ 1501-1506 (1968)). Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 472 Pa. 129,
139-40, 371 A.2d 468, 473 (1977). In 1974, the PCHA court ruled that Sullivan had been
denied effective assistance of counsel on appeal and permitted him to file a second direct
appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. All other grounds for relief were rejected. Id.
The Supreme Court affirmed both Sullivan's original conviction and the denial of his peti-
tion for postconviction relief. Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 472 Pa. 129, 371 A.2d 468 (1977).
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livan's two attorneys stated that he did not present a defense for Sullivan
"because [he] thought [he] would be exposing the [defense] witnesses for
the other two trials coming up."'" Sullivan recalled that he wanted to tes-
tify in his own defense but was convinced to refrain from doing so by his
attorneys.52 The other attorney testified, however, that despite his urging
Sullivan refused to take the stand.53
Having exh'austed his remedies in the state courts, Sullivan again sought
habeas corpus relief in federal district court.54 On the issue of ineffective
assistance of counsel, the district court accepted the state supreme court's
ruling that there had been no multiple representation since Sullivan's chief
counsel had only assisted at the trials of his codefendants. 5 The Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed,56 holding that there was multiple
representation and that the defendant was entitled to reversal if he could
51. Record at 101, Post-Conviction Hearing Act Petition (Testimony of Charles Peruto,
Esq.), reprinted in Brief for Petitioner at 57 app., Cuyler v. Sullivan, 100 S. Ct, 1708 (1980).
Sullivan and his codefendants were represented by two attorneys, one chief counsel, and one
assistant. Their roles were reversed at the later trials of Sullivan's codefendants. See note
57 infra.
52. Record at 158-64, 196, 214-15, Post-Conviction Hearing Act Petition (Testimony of
John Sullivan), reprinted in Brief for Petitioner at 100-06 app., 138 app., 156-57 app., Cuyler
v. Sullivan, 100 S. Ct. 1708 (1980).
53. Record at 10, 11, Post-Conviction Hearing Act Petition (Testimony of G. Fred
DiBona, Esq.), reprinted in Brief for Petitioner at 12, 13 app., Cuyler v. Sullivan, 100 S. Ct.
1708 (1980).
54. Sullivan alleged the following grounds for relief:
(I) that the admission into evidence of color slides of the victims' bodies was a
denial of due process; (2) that the factual basis underlying this conviction was so
totally devoid of evidentiary support as to deny him due process; (3) that defense
counsel had a conflict of interest because they also represented his two codefend-
ants; (4) that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to certain testimony; (5)
that counsel was ineffective for failing to reserve objections to the offering of a
secret memorandum to the trial judge; (6) that the trial judge erred in his instruc-
tions to the jury so as to deny him due process; and (7) that the failure of the
prosecution to disclose to the defense certain evidence denied him due process.
United States ex rel. Sullivan v. Cuyler, 593 F.2d 512, 515-16 (3d Cir. 1979).
The United States magistrate to whom the petition was referred for report and recommen-
dation found that all grounds except dual representation were without merit. The magis-
trate recommended that the writ be issued because Sullivan's counsel also represented his
codefendants and a possibility of conflict of interest was apparent from the record. Id at
516.
55. Id Although both attorneys, G. Fred DiBona (now Judge DiBona, Court of Com-
mon Pleas, Philadelphia) and A. Charles Peruto, participated in all three trials, they testified
that DiBona served as principal trial counsel, with Peruto assisting, for Sullivan's trial. In
the subsequent trials of the codefendants Peruto served as principal counsel, assisted by
DiBona. Although the attorneys worked together on this case there is no indication in the
record that they were from the same firm or otherwise associated in practice. Id at 517-19.
56. United States ex rel. Sullivan v. Cuyler, 593 F.2d 512 (3d Cir. 1979).
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make "some showing of a possible conflict of interest or prejudice, how-
ever remote."57 In Sullivan's case, the court found that although the deci-
sion of defense attorneys to rest at the close of the prosecution was a
legitimate trial tactic, it raised the possibility of a conflict. This finding,
along with co-counsel's admission that concern for Sullivan's codefendants
prompted him to advise Sullivan to rest his defense, evidenced sufficient
conflict to require reversal on the grounds that Sullivan's right to effective
assistance of counsel had been violated.58
On the threshold issue of whether multiple representation had occurred,
the Supreme Court agreed with the court of appeals. Sullivan's trial was
separate from those of his codefendants, and his attorneys testified in post-
conviction hearings that their roles of assistant and lead counsel at Sulli-
van's trial were reversed at the trial of his codefendants.59 Nonetheless,
the court of appeals found that both attorneys participated significantly at
all three trials,6" and the Supreme Court agreed that these facts established
the existence of multiple representation.6 Thus, regardless of the number
of attorneys or the separation of proceedings, multiple representation had
occurred in Sullivan's case.
The Supreme Court, however, rejected as overbroad the circuit court's
standard that even a remote possibility of a conflict of interest required
reversal. "A possible conflict inheres in almost every instance of multiple
representation," the Court said.62 Thus a reviewing court should not pre-
sume that the mere possibility of conflict necessarily renders assistance of
counsel ineffective.63 Quoting Justice Frankfurter's dissent in Glasser, the
Court pointed out that such a standard "would preclude multiple represen-
tation even in cases where a 'common defense. . . gives strength against a
common attack.' "64 Although the Court concluded on the basis of Glasser
57. Id. at 517 (quoting Walker v. United States, 422 F,2d 374, 375 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
399 U.S. 915 (1970)). See note 40 supra.
58. United States ex rel. Sullivan v. Cuyler, 593 F.2d at 521-22.
59. The Court noted that separate trials "significantly reduce" the possibility of a con-
flict. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 100 S. Ct. 1708, 1717-18 (1980). For example, inconsistent defenses
can be raised at separate trials and the jury may never know that an inconsistency even
exists.
60. United States ex rel. Sullivan v. Cuyler, 593 F.2d at 518-19.
61. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 100 S. Ct. at 1715.
62. Id at 1718.
63. Id.
64. Id (quoting Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 92 (1942) (Frankfurter, J., dis-
senting)). Justice Frankfurter was referring to the defense tactic of "stonewalling," main-
taining a solid front against the prosecution. This trial strategy is particularly useful in cases
involving organized crime, white collar crime, or government corruption where there may be
no real witnesses except the defendants. Successful prosecution of any of the defendants
[Vol. 30:103
Multiple Representation
and Holloway that a defendant need not demonstrate prejudice arising
from a conflict, it held that "to demonstrate a violation of his Sixth
Amendment rights, a defendant must establish that an actual conflict of
interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance."65 The Court re-
manded the case for further consideration of Sullivan's claim that even
under this standard he could prevail by showing such an adverse effect.66
In addition, although the question was not specifically raised in the
lower court decision, the Supreme Court pointed out that absent a timely
objection by the defense, state courts had no duty to initiate an inquiry
into the propriety of joint representation under the sixth amendment.67
may hinge on the defection of one to testify for the prosecution. "Stonewalling" is also a
successful tactic in grand jury proceedings. See Moore, Disqualfication of an Attorney Rep-
resenting Multile Witnesses Before a Grand Jury Legal Ethics and the Stonewall Defense, 27
U.C.L.A.L. REV. 1 (1979); Note, Ethics, JudicialPower, and the Sixth Amendment: Parillo v.
Takiff, 37 U. PiTT. L. REV. 577 (1976).
65. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 100 S. Ct. at 1719. The distinction here, if one exists, is a very
fine one.
66. Id. On August 19, 1980, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit remanded the
case to the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania for rehearing consistent
with the opinion of the Supreme Court.
67. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 100 S. Ct. at 1717. In Holloway, the Court had warned that
should a defendant or his attorney raise a timely objection to joint representation at trial, the
trial court must afford the defendant an opportunity to show that potential conflicts endan-
ger his right to a fair trial. Failure to investigate such timely objections would require auto-
matic reversal. Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 488 (1978). Sullivan stated the
converse of this principle, holding that absent a timely objection there is no consitutional
requirement of an inquiry by the trial court into all cases of joint representation. Inquiry is
only necessary if the trial court "knows or reasonably should know that a particular conflict
exists." 100 S. Ct. at 1717. Thus the sixth and fourteenth amendments do not normally
require in state proceedings that the court initiate an inquiry.
A defendant has a sixth amendment right to effective representation in all courts, state or
federal, in criminal cases after Gideon v. Wainwright. See notes 22-24 and accompanying
text supra. The "adverse effect" standard announced in Sullivan determines whether a de-
fendant has been denied that right and hence applies to state and federal courts. This is so
despite the fact that a defendant in state court may not have benefited from a required
inquiry.
The reason the Court refused to find an inquiry constitutionally mandated may lie in its
reluctance in the area of criminal procedure, in recent years, to infer rules of law from the
Constitution, preferring instead that Congress pass appropriate reforming legislation. See,
e.g., Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 567 (1978) (legislation, not the fourteenth
amendment, is the proper means to protect newspapers, as third parties, from searches with-
out subpoenas); Manson v. Braithwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 118 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring)
("procedures for the identification of suspects are more effectively developed by legislation
than by judicial fiat").
Nevertheless, in light of proposed Rule 44(c) and the Court's endorsement of it in Sulli-
van, an inquiry is advisable if not mandated in all cases of joint representation in federal
courts. But see Tague, Multiple Representation and Conflicts of Interest in Criminal Cases, 67
GEO. L.J. 1075, 1108-22 (1979) (there may be some question as to whether all the provisions
of Rule 44(c) are constitutional).
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The Court noted that defense counsel had an ethical obligation to avoid
conflicts of interest and to advise the trial court immediately of any such
conflict. Consequently, absent objection by the defendant or his counsel, a
court may assume that no conflict of interest exists or that the client and
his attorney "knowingly accept such risk as may exist."68
Despite the foregoing, the Court noted its approval of Rule 44(c), a pro-
posed addition to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.69 Rule 44(c)
would require that federal courts "shall promptly inquire with respect to
. . .joint representation and shall personally advise each defendant of his
right to effective assistance of counsel, including separate representa-
tion."7 ° Although this rule is apparently acceptable to the Supreme Court
as a federal court requirement, the Court did not find the duty to inquire
constitutionally mandated."'
The Sullivan Court also concluded that a single standard applies to con-
flicts involving both appointed and retained counsel, 2 dispelling any pos-
sible inference from Glasser and Holloway that a different standard might
apply in cases involving retained counsel. In fact, prior to Sullivan, five
circuit courts and at least six state courts employed standards that varied
according to whether counsel had been assigned or retained.'3 These
68. Id This ethical obligation arises from ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS
Nos. 5 and 9 as well as from similar provisions in state bar association rules. See notes 76-
79 and accompanying text infra.
69. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 100 S. Ct. at 1717 n.10.
70. For the text of Rule 44(c) and a discussion of its implications, see notes 91-99 and
accompanying text infra.
71. The Court noted that it found such a rule to be an appropriate exercise of the fed-
eral courts' supervisory power and that only the Second Circuit, in Colon v. Fogg, 603 F.2d
403 (2d Cir. 1979), had found such an inquiry to be required by the sixth amendment and
therefore required of state courts. 100 S. Ct. at 1717 n.10. The Sullivan Court also stated:
"nothing in our precedents suggests that the sixth amendment requires state courts them-
selves to initiate inquiries into the propriety of multiple representation in every case." 100 S.
Ct. at 1717.
72. See note 71 and accompanying text infra.
73. The Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits employed different standards
of review depending on whether counsel was assigned or retained, as did Alabama, Califor-
nia, Montana, Oklahoma, Tennessee and Texas. See United States v. Atkinson, 565 F.2d
1283 (4th Cir. 1977) (suggests greater need to inquire if counsel is appointed); Alvarez v.
Wainwright, 522 F.2d 100, 105 n.l I (5th Cir. 1975) (the court must inquire in cases of re-
tained counsel only when the conflict is so apparent that the trial judge "should have been
aware of and corrected it"); United States v. Cale, 418 F.2d 897, 898 (6th Cir. 1969) ("pri-
vately retained counsel's determination that there was no conflict of interest must weigh
heavily" against the defendant); Fryar v. United States, 404 F.2d 1071, 1073 (10th Cir. 1968)
(the court suggested appointment of separate counsel for indigent codefendants); United
States v. Gougis, 374 F.2d 758, 761 (7th Cir. 1967) ("[In the case of appointed counsel], it is
especially important for the [trial] court to determine that no prejudice will result from mul-
tiple representation."); Lee v. State, 57 Ala. App. 366, 328 So. 2d 617, 622 (Crim. App.), cert.
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courts reasoned that claims of ineffective representation by appointed
counsel demanded close scrutiny because the courts themselves caused the
joint representation; whereas, in cases of retained counsel the defendants
chose multiple representation themselves and should not be heard to com-
plain of a resulting conflict. This double standard was resolved in Sulli-
van: "A proper respect for the Sixth Amendment disarms petitioner's
contention that defendants who retain their own lawyers are entitled to less
protection than defendants for whom the state appoints counsel."74 Not-
ing that experience indicated that "in some cases, retained counsel will not
provide adequate representation," the Court concluded that "the vital
guarantee of the Sixth Amendment would stand for little if the often unin-
formed decision to retain a particular lawyer could reduce or forfeit the
defendant's entitlement to constitutional protection."75 Thus, the Court
found no reason to distinguish between retained and appointed counsel.
Justice Brennan concurred with the majority's requirement of a showing
of actual conflict adversely affecting counsel's performance. He went fur-
ther, however, by maintaining that the sixth amendment creates an affirm-
ative duty on the part of the trial court to inquire into the possibility of any
conflict of interest. Being of constitutional dimension, this duty would ap-
ply to state courts as well as to federal courts.7 6 He also concluded that the
denied, 292 Ala. 409, 328 So. 2d 624 (1976) ("it is less difficult to find an infringement of
one's Sixth Amendment right" where counsel is appointed); People v. Cook, 13 Cal. 3d 663,
532 P.2d 148, 119 Cal. Rptr. 500, 532 P.2d 148 (1975) (where counsel is appointed, the court
has the burden of ascertaining whether a potential conflict exists; where counsel retained,
relief will only be granted if the trial was a "farce or a sham"); State v. Meidinger, 160 Mont.
310, 502 P.2d 58, 66 (1972) ("where two defendants desire to retain one counsel their deci-
sion should be honored"); Wright v. State, 505 P.2d 507, 513 (Okla. Crim. App. 1973) ("We
hold that these defendants cannot now be heard to complain of any error committed by
counsel whom they selected and retained."); Leeper v. State, 472 S.W.2d 240 (Tenn. Crim.
App. 1971) (acts or nonacts of retained counsel are not imputable to the state); Stutes v.
State, 530 S.W.2d 309 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975) (where counsel is appointed, defendant must
show an actual conflict; in case of retained counsel no relief will be granted unless the "rep-
resentation was fettered or restrained by his commitments to others, and such commitments
were unknown to the defendant"). See also Brief for Petitioner at 48-69, Cuyler v. Sullivan,
100 S. Ct. 1708 (1980).
74. 100 S. Ct. at 1716 (1980).
75. Id The Court had already found that a criminal trial conducted by a state satisfies
the requirement of state action required for habeas corpus relief and involves the state in the
defendant's conviction. Id at 1715. As a result, the appointment of counsel by the trial
court was not necessary to constitute the "state action" required for habeas corpus relief. Id
at 1716.
76. Justice Brennan cited Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938), Glasser v. United
States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942), and Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978). He argued that
the principles of those cases are "honored only if the accused has the active protection of the
trial court in assuring that no potential for divergence in interests threatens the adequacy of
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Court's standard for a showing of conflict was unacceptable where, as in
Sullivan, no evidence existed that the defendant's choice of joint represen-
tation was knowing and intelligent.77 Justice Marshall agreed with Justice
Brennan that state courts should bear a duty of inquiry. He dissented,
though, from the majority's "adversely affected" standard for the requisite
showing of conflict, stating that it was unreasonably high and that the de-
fendant should only be required to show that an actual relevant conflict
existed during the representation.78
III. Cuyler v. Sullivan: A Critical View
In discussing the constitutional dimensions of multiple representation,
the Sullivan Court relied upon basic assumptions of questionable validity.
Neither the ethical obligations imposed on attorneys nor the implied
waiver derived from a defendant's silence provides adequate protection for
the accused who shares counsel with codefendants. Moreover, the requi-
site showing of "adverse effect" may be, in a practical sense, an impossible
burden for the defendant.
In concluding that the sixth amendment requires no inquiry by state
courts, the Supreme Court relied in part on the ethical obligation of attor-
neys to "avoid conflicting representations and to advise the court promptly
when a conflict of interest arises. . . .,,7 Although the American Bar As-
sociation Code of Professional Responsibility and the proposed Model
Rules of Professional Conduct urge an attorney to avoid accepting em-
ployment from clients with differing interests, he may still represent such
clients if he believes he can do so adequately and if the clients consent
after being fully informed.8° Thus, a distinction is drawn between a per-
counsel's representation." Cuyler v. Sullivan, 100 S. Ct. at 1719-20 (Brennan, J., concur-
ring).
77. Justice Brennan wrote: "Had the trial record in the present case shown that respon-
dent made a knowing and intelligent choice of joint representation, I could accept the
Court's standard for a post-conviction determination as to whether respondent in fact was
denied effective assistance." Id Cf. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 235-48 (1972)
(consent to a search must be voluntary but not necessarily knowing and intelligent, as there
is a "vast difference" between those rights guaranteeing a fair criminal trial and the rights
guaranteed by the fourth amendment).
78. Justice Marshall, citing Glasser and Holloway, reasoned, "Because it is the simulta-
neous representation of conflicting interests against which the Sixth Amendment protects a
defendant, he need go no further than show the existence of an actual conflict." Cuyler v.
Sullivan, 100 S. Ct. 1708, 1722 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
79. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 100 S. Ct. at 1717.
80. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS No. 5 states: "A lawyer should exercise
independent professional judgment on behalf of a client." In its aspirational standards of
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missible degree of divergence of interests and an improper conflict of inter-
ests. An attorney must only advise the trial court if the latter arises. The
problem inherent in this analysis is that the determination of whether an
improper conflict exists is based on a subjective evaluation by the lawyer,
and the client's consent is based upon information from the same source.8 '
By relying on the attorney's ethical obligation, the Court places inordinate
weight on the attorney's judgment. The Code and the proposed Rules are
meant only to guide and discipline lawyers, not to guarantee a defendant
his constitutional rights. While a lawyer must be expected to avoid con-
flicts of interest in joint representation, this obligation does not relieve the
trial court of its duty to protect the defendant's rights.82
Indeed, the Court arguably had adequate precedent on which to base a
constitutionally mandated duty to inquire.83 Glasser, for example, clearly
conduct for attorneys, the Ethical Considerations (EC), the ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY adds: "Maintaining the independence of professional judgment required of
a lawyer precludes his acceptance or continuation of employment that will adversely affect
his judgment on behalf of or dilute his loyalty to a client." ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-14 (1969). But Disciplinary Rule (DR) 5-105(c) states: "a lawyer
may represent multiple clients if it is obvious that he can adequately represent the interest of
each and if each consents to the representation after full disclosure of the possible effect of
such representation on the exercise of his independent professional judgment on behalf of
each." The ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY was adopted by the American
Bar Association on August 12, 1969. Section 1.8 of the Discussion Draft of the ABA MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, reprinted in 48 U.S.L.W. 32 (1980) (special section),
allows a lawyer to represent diverse interests which might adversely affect his representation
of a client only if (I) the client consents after adequate disclosure and (2) the "representation
can otherwise be performed in accordance with the Rules of Professional Conduct." See
also The Roscoe Pound-American Trial Lawyer's Foundation, Commission on Professional
Responsibility, AMERICAN LAWYER'S CODE OF CONDUCT, PUBLIC DISCUSSION DRAFT Rule
2.4, 201 (June 1980) ("A lawyer may serve one or more clients, despite a divided loyalty, if
each client who is or may be adversely affected by the divided loyalty is fully informed of
the actual or potential adverse effects, and voluntarily consents.") But see ABA CANONS OF
PROFESSIONAL ETHICS No. 9 ("A lawyer should avoid even the appearance of professional
impropriety.").
81. Of course, unless the attorney explains to each defendant individually his alterna-
tive courses of action, the defendant's acquiescence should hardly be interpreted as an intel-
ligent and knowing waiver. This is particularly true since an attorney may honestly feel he
can represent all the defendants adequately and allow that feeling subconsciously to influ-
ence the thoroughness of his disclosure to his clients. An inquiry by the trial court would
assure that the attorney fully performs his ethical duty.
82. As the Court declared in Glasser, "Upon the trial judge rests the duty of seeing that
the trial is conducted with solicitude for the essential rights of the accused. . . . The trial
court should protect the right of an accused to have the assistance of counsel." 315 U.S. at
71.
83. The Court in Sullivan dismissed the possibility of a constitutionally required in-
quiry by saying that none of its previous cases suggested that an inquiry into every case of
multiple representation was required by the sixth amendment. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 100 S. Ct.
at 1717. However, the Court has, in the past, conceded that constitutional protections are
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endorsed the duty of the trial court to make an inquiry:
Upon the trial judge rests the duty of seeing that the trial is
conducted with solicitude for the essential rights of the ac-
cused. . . .The trial court should protect the right of an accused
to have the assistance of counsel. "This protecting duty imposes
the serious and weighty responsibility upon the trial judge of de-
termining whether there is an intelligent and competent waiver
by the accused. While an accused may waive the right to counsel,
whether there is a proper waiver should be clearly determined by
the trial court, and it would be fitting and appropriate for that
determination to appear upon the record." 4
As Justice Brennan wrote in his concurrence in Sullivan, "the principle
is honored only if the accused has the active protection of the trial
court."85 Thus, a constitutionally mandated duty of inquiry had been sug-
gested in prior case law but was suprisingly rejected by the Sullivan Court,
despite the majority's concession that a possible conflict exists in almost
every case of joint representation.
Despite this questionable reliance on the attorney's ethical obligations,
the Court concluded that absent objection by the defendant or his attor-
ney, the trial judge may assume either that there is no conflict in the multi-
ple representation or that the defendants and their counsel accept the risk
of whatever conflict may exist.86 This language implies that the trial court
may assume a waiver of conflict-free representation from the defendant's
silence. Such an assumption had apparently been rejected by the Court in
previous decisions.8 7 For example, in Glasser, where the defendant was an
not diminished by precedent. Justice White, who joined the majority opinion in Sullivan,
wrote in a prior case: "That the Court's holding today is neither compelled nor even
strongly suggested by the language of the Fifth Amendment, is at odds with American and
English legal history, and involves a departure from a long line of precedent does not prove
either that the Court has exceeded its powers or that the Court is wrong or unwise." Mi-
randa v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 531-32 (1966) (White, J., dissenting). Rather, deviation from
prior decisions merely emphasizes the fact that the Court is creating "new law and new
public policy." Justice White continued: "This is what the Court has historically done. In-
deed, it is what it must do until and unless there is some fundamental change in the constitu-
tional distribution of government powers." Of course, such a decision must be advisable in
relation to the long-range interests of the country and "be a fair exposition of the constitu-
tional provision which its opinion interprets." Id
84. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 71 (1942) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304
U.S. 458, 465 (1938)).
85. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 100 S. Ct. at 1720 (Brennan, J., concurring).
86. 100 S. Ct. at 1717.
87. The Court in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464-65 (1938), noted that courts "in-
dulge every presumption against the waiver of fundamental constitutional rights" and con-
cluded that "while an accused may waive the right to counsel, whether there is a proper
waiver should be clearly determined by the trial court, and it would be fitting and appropri-
[Vol. 30:103
Multiple Representation
attorney, the Court rejected the argument that he had tacitly acquiesced to
joint representation by his silence. 88 Finally, in announcing the standard
for reversal when a defendant raises a conflict issue on appeal, the Court
rejected aper se rule requiring reversal if a conflict is shown. Although the
Court's standard does not require the defendant to demonstrate prejudice
to his case, he must show that "an actual conflict of interest adversely af-
fected his lawyer's performance."8 9 The defendant must first show an ac-
tual conflict between his interests and those of a codefendant; he must then
show, by some tangible evidence, that his attorney's performance suffered
as a direct result. Since a conflict of interest often produces prejudicial
restraint on the part of the attorney rather than an easily identifiable af-
firmative act working to the detriment of his client,9° evidence proving this
negative may be impossible to produce. In the usual case one might not
expect an attorney to make the type of damaging admissions made by Sul-
ate for that determination to appear upon the record." The Court in Zerbst clearly did not
advise that a waiver of effective counsel should be assumed from a defendant's silence. Sim-
ilarly, in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), Chief Justice Warren wrote, "This Court
has always set high standards of proof for the waiver of constitutional rights." Id at 475
(quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938)).
88. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. at 70. The Court in Glasser declared, "we in-
dulge every reasonable presumption against the waiver of fundamental rights. . . . The fact
that Glasser is an attorney is, of course, immaterial to a consideration of his right to the
protection of the Sixth Amendment." Id Such an assumption is also expressly rejected in
the Advisory Committee Note to Rule 44(c). "When there has been 'no discussion as to
possible conflict initiated by the court,' it cannot be assumed that the choice of counsel by
the defendants 'was intelligently made with knowledge of any possible conflict.'" 77 F.R.D.
507, 597 (1978) (quoting United States v. Carrigan, 543 F.2d 1053, 1055 (2d Cir. 1976)).
89. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 100 S. Ct. at 1719.
90. The following are some examples of prejudicial restraint or omissions on the part of
an attorney. An attorney representing both minor and adult defendants might fail to advise
the minor of her option of testifying against the adult in exchange for a reduced charge or
immunity. Or the attorney might fail to argue at a sentencing hearing that the minor was led
astray by the other older defendant, who had a long police record.
A lawyer also might fail to present a witness who would exculpate one defendant but
inculpate another because the lawyer represents both defendants. The Court in Holloway v.
Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 490 (1978), emphasized, "in a case of joint representation of con-
flicting interests the evil - it bears repeating - is in what the advocate finds himself com-
pelled to refrain from doing, not only at trial but also as to possible pretrial plea negotiations
and in the sentencing process" (emphasis in original). The difficulty of finding conflict in the
trial record was recognized by the District of Columbia Circuit: "Like the famous tip of the
iceberg, the record may not reveal the whole story; apparently minor instances in the record
which suggest codefendants' conflicting interests may well be the telltale signs of deeper
conflict." Lollar v. United States, 376 F.2d 243, 246-47 (D.C. Cir. 1967). See Hyman, Joint
Representation of Multiple Defendants in a Criminal Trial The Court's Headache, 5 HOF-
STRA L. REV. 315, 324-29 (1977); Comment, Conflict of Interests in Multile Representation of
Criminal Co-Defendants, 68 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 226, 230 (1977).
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livan's attorney.9
The Supreme Court recognized the need to establish a standard for re-
versal high enough to defeat frivolous claims of a prejudicial conflict yet
low enough to permit injured defendants to obtain relief. In so doing, the
Court sought to strike a balance between a per se rule and a showing of
actual prejudice.92 Although the "adverse effect" standard puts a heavy
burden of proof on the defendant, it seems a reasonable requirement
where the trial court has both advised the defendant of his right to separate
counsel and has made an inquiry into potential conflict. The defendant in
this case would have knowingly accepted the possibility of conflict. Where
the accused has not been so advised by the trial court, however, this stan-
dard would impose an unreasonable burden upon a typically unknowing
defendant who has secured multiple representation without understanding
or appreciating his rights or the dangers involved.
In view of the difficulty of proving on appeal that an attorney's perform-
ance had been adversely affected by a conflict of interest, it would seem
thai the choice of joint representation is tantamount to a waiver of conflict-
free representation. Such a choice should therefore be knowing and intel-
ligent, require an inquiry by the trial judge, and appear on the record, as
required in Zerbst.9 3 If the defendant's right to effective representation is
to be protected, the time for the court to concern itself with conflicts is
during a pretrial hearing rather than during a postconviction appeal.
IV. RULE 44(c): THE BETTER SOLUTION
Proposed Rule 44(c) would amend the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure to require federal trial courts to explore the propriety of joint repre-
sentation in all cases and to advise defendants individually of their right to
91. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 100 S. Ct. at 1723 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
92. As the Court noted in Sullivan, there is a possibility for conflict in almost every case
of multiple representation. If the standard for reversal was not high, all convicted defend-
ants jointly represented at trial would be able to appeal successfully. 100 S. Ct. at 1718. But
see Lowenthal, Joint Representation in Criminal Cases: A Critical Appraisal, 64 VA. L. REV.
939 (1978). Lowenthal argues for creating a prophylactic rule prohibiting joint representa-
tion as violative of the sixth amendment as well as for revising the ABA CODE OF PROFES-
SIONAL RESPONSIBILITY to ban joint representation in criminal cases. Id at 983-89. See
also Geer, Representation of Multiple Criminal Defendants: Conflicts of Interest and the Pro-
fessional Responsibilities of the Defense Attorney, 62 MINN. L. REV. 119 (1978). Geer also
argues for a per se rule against joint representation but finds that "the answer to conflicts of
interest in multiple representation lies not in constitutional principle or judicial rule making,
but in a practicing bar more concerned with an effective, fair, and efficient judicial system
than with the narrow self-interest of themselves and their clients." Id at 121-22.
93. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 465 (1938). See note 84 supra.
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effective representation, including separate counsel. 94 Although it en-
dorsed this rule, the Sullivan Court found no constitutional requirement
under the sixth amendment that state courts inquire into the possibility of
conflict in all cases of joint representation, 95 despite having admitted that a
possible conflict exists in nearly every case of multiple representation. 96
Apparently the Court recognized the need for protection from potential
conflict, but relegated enforcement of this protection to legislative rule
94. Proposed Rule 44(c) provides:
Whenever two or more defendants have been jointly charged pursuant to Rule 8(b)
[defendants alleged to have participated in the same act or transaction may be
charged in the same indictment or information] or have been joined for trial pursu-
ant to Rule 13 [indictments may be joined for trial if the offenses and defendants
could have been joined in a single indictment or information], and are represented
by the same retained or assigned counsel or by retained or assigned counsel who
are associated in the practice of law, the court shall promptly inquire with respect
to such joint representation and shall personally advise each defendant of his right
to the effective assistance of counsel, including separate representation. Unless it
appears that there is good cause to believe no conflict of interest is likely to arise,
the court shall take such measures as may be appropriate to protect each defend-
ant's right to counsel.
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United
States, Preliminary Draft of ProposedAmendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts, Rules Governing
Section 2255 Proceedings/or the United States District Courts, and Federal Rules of Evidence,
77 F.R.D. 507, 593 (1978).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1976), the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court calls the chief
judges of each judicial circuit, the Court Claims, and the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals, and a district judge from each circuit to the Judicial Conference of the United
States. The Judicial Conference studies the condition of the courts, and the rules of practice
and procedure, and suggests changes and additions for consideration by the Supreme Court.
Rule 44(c) was proposed and approved by the Judicial Conference on September 22, 1978,
and submitted to the Supreme Court on November 1, 1978. On April 30, 1979, the Supreme
Court promulgated Rule 44(c) as an amendment to the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure. Congress has postponed the enactment of Rule 44(c) until December 1, 1980, or until,
and to the extent approved by, an act of Congress, whichever is earlier. Act of July 31, 1979,
Pub. L. 96-42, 93 Stat. 326 (1979). Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (1976), the Supreme Court
has the power to prescribe rules of pleading, practice, and procedure for use in the United
States District Courts in criminal proceedings. Congress, however, may delay the effective
date, reject, or amend the proposed rules. The proposed rules are suggested by the Advisory
Committee on Criminal Rules of the Judicial Conference of the United States. The propos-
als are first considered by the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure and then, if
approved, submitted to the full Judicial Conference. When approved by the Judicial Con-
ference the proposed rules are then submitted to the Supreme Court. If the Court also ap-
proves them the Chief Justice sends them to Congress. But see 34 L. Ed. 2d lxvi (1972), in
which Justice Douglas dissented from the Supreme Court's approval of the Federal Rules of
Evidence. "[T]his Court doesn't write the Rules, nor supervise their writing, nor appraise
them on their merits . . . our approval being merely perfunctory. . . . [W]e are merely the
conduit to Congress."
95. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 100 S. Ct. at 1717.
96. Id at 1718.
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rather than to constitutional mandate. Absent such a rule at the state level,
however, the necessary protection may be nonexistent after Sullivan. This
arises in large part from the Sullivan Court's conclusion that unless objec-
tion is made, the trial court can assume no unacceptable conflict exists.
This assumption by the Supreme Court directly contradicts the Advisory
Committee Note to proposed Rule 44(c). As to whether the trial court may
assume that a defendant knowingly accepts the risk of conflict, the Advi-
sory Committee Note states that "when there has been 'no discussion as to
possible conflict initiated by the court,' it cannot be assumed that the
choice of counsel by the defendants 'was intelligently made with knowl-
edge of any possible conflict.' "9 Similarly, the Court has declared in
other contexts that while an accused may waive the right to counsel,
whether the waiver is knowing and intelligent should be resolved by the
trial court, and the discussion should appear on the record.98 The Advi-
sory Committee Note further adds that "recordation of the waiver col-
loque [sic] between defendant and judge will also serve the government's
interest by assisting in shielding any potential conviction from collateral
attack, either on Sixth Amendment grounds or on a Fifth or Fourteenth
Amendment 'fundamental fairness' basis." 99
In response to such concerns, Rule 44(c) requires the trial court to take
appropriate measures to protect the defendant's right to counsel unless
there is "good cause to believe no conflict of interest is likely to arise.'
The Advisory Committee explains this requirement:
A less demanding standard would not adequately protect the
Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel or the
effective administration of criminal justice. It would not suffice,
97. 77 F.R.D. 593, 597 (1978) (quoting United States v. Carrigan, 543 F.2d 1053, 1057
(2d Cir. 1976)). The Advisory Committee Note is intended to explain the rule and provide
guidelines for its application. See also United States v. Dolan, 570 F.2d 1177, 1181 (3d Cir.
1978); United States v. Lawriw, 568 F.2d 98, 105 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 969
(1978). But see United States v. Mandell, 525 F.2d 671, 677 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 1049 (1976) (defense counsel has responsibility to inform defendants of dangers of joint
representation).
98. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 465 (1938) (reversing a federal court conviction for
passing and possession of counterfeit money because defendants were not provided counsel
and no waiver of the right to counsel was on the record). See ABA STANDARDS, THE FUNC-
TION OF THE TRIAL JUDGE § 3.4 (1972) (a trial judge should inquire in case of joint repre-
sentation into "potential conflicts which may jeopardize the right of each defendant to the
fidelity of his counsel").
99. 77 F.R.D. at 601 (quoting United States v. Garcia, 517 F.2d 272, 278 (5th Cir. 1975)
(reversing an order disqualifying three attorneys, the court held even if conflicts existed,
defendants had right to waive their right to conflict-free counsel; but to be effective the
waiver must be intelligent and knowing)).
100. 77 F.R.D. at 593.
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for example, to require the court to act only when a conflict of
interest is then apparent, for it is .not possible to "anticipate with
complete accuracy the course that a criminal trial may take."''
The Advisory Committee, therefore, views an inquiry as necessary to pro-
tect the defendant's sixth amendment right to effective assistance of coun-
sel. 102
An inquiry and warning such as that required by Rule 44(c) is not un-
precendented.'0 3 For example, the Miranda"° warnings required by the
fifth amendment are analogous in many respects to the rule 44(c) warn-
ings. Miranda required that a suspect be advised of his right to remain
101. Id at 599-600.
102. Id. The solutions advocated by the Advisory Committee require either an intelli-
gent and knowing waiver or appointment of separate counsel. The Note suggests that in
some cases the trial court may require separate counsel in spite of an effective waiver. Al-
though all of the witnesses before the House Criminal Justice Subcommittee endorsed the
duty of inquiry imposed by Rule 44(c), all but the Chairman of the Advisory Committee
voiced disapproval of a section of the Rule allowing the judge to disqualify defense attor-
neys in his discretion if the defendant's right to effective representation is endangered. See
Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.- Hearings on HR. 7473
Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1980) [hereinafter cited as Hearings]. Generally witnesses found the suggestion
that disqualification be available to be inconsistent with the recognition in Sullivan and
prior cases of the right of multiple representation. Specifically, some witnesses pointed to
the Court's apparent endorsement of multiple representation in repeating in both Holloway
and Sullivan Justice Frankfurter's dissent in Glasser v. United States that "[a] common de-
fense. . . gives strength against a common attack." 315 U.S. 60, 92 (1942) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting in part and concurring in part). The statement submitted by Robert L. Weinberg,
a partner in the law firm of Williams and Connolly, also quoted from United States v.
Garcia: "if defendants may dispense with the right to be represented by counsel altogether,
Faretta v. California,. . . it would seem that they may waive the right to have their retained
counsel free from conflicts of interest." Hearings at 23 (statement of Robert L. Weinberg,
Esq.) (quoting United States v. Garcia, 517 F.2d 272, 277 (5th Cir. 1975)). See also Faretta
v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). In addition Mr. Weinberg noted that the waivability of
the right to conflict-free counsel has been recognized directly or by implication by courts in
10 of the I 1 circuits. Hearings at 21-22 n.3 (statement of Robert L. Weinberg, Esq.). The
Federal, Public and Community Defenders Association worried that disqualification mo-
tions would be used by the Department of Justice to break down stonewall defenses and to
exclude particular attorneys. See note 61 supra. Their position on an inquiry was more
positive: "Although the Supreme Court has decided the Sixth Amendment does not require
a warning or inquiry as a matter of course, we feel such a provision would enhance both the
appearance and fact of fairness." Federal, Public and Community Defenders, Position Pa-
per and Testimony on the Proposed Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (May 30, 1980).
The House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice amended Rule 44(c) by deleting the second
sentence. Approved on August 27, 1980, by the House Judiciary Committee, the Rule is
now before the House of Representatives as H.R. 7817.
103. When a Rule 44(c) inquiry and advisement is mentioned subsequently it will refer
only to the inquiry and advisement contemplated by Rule 44(c) and not the power of dis-
qualification suggested by Rule 44(c) and discussed above at note 99 supra.
104. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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silent and to have appointed or retained counsel present prior to any custo-
dial interrogation.' 5 The Court found these warnings necessary to protect
a defendant's fifth amendment right against self-incrimination. Similarly,
as the Advisory Committee Note indicates, the Rule 44(c) inquiry has been
added to assure a defendant the effective representation guaranteed him by
the sixth amendment. Thus, in both instances the inquiry or warning is
thought to be necessary to protect a constitutional right.' °6
Several of the reasons supporting the requirement of Miranda warnings
are equally applicable to the Rule 44(c) inquiry. Regarding the simplicity
of a warning, Chief Justice Warren wrote:
The Fifth Amendment privilege is so fundamental to our sys-
tem of constitutional rule and the expedient of giving an ade-
quate warning as to the availability of the privilege so simple, we
will not pause to inquire in individual cases whether the defend-
ant was aware of his right without a warning being given. As-
sessments of the knowledge the defendant possesses . . . can
never be more than speculation; a warning is a clearcut fact. 0 7
Similarly, deciding on appeal whether a defendant knowingly waived his
right to the effective assistance of counsel is mere speculation, while a pre-
trial warning and judicial inquiry establishes an indisputable fact. Since
the sixth amendment right to assistance of counsel has been declared fun-
damental by the Supreme Court, the simple expedient of an inquiry by the
105. Miranda demanded that an explanation of an accused's rights be given prior to any
custodial interrogation (any setting where the accused is significantly deprived of his free-
dom of action) to ensure that his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination is
protected. The case was combined with three other cases: all were appeals of convictions
based on confessions obtained during interrogation of the accused while they were held
incommunicado and without attorneys or an explanation of their rights. The Court empha-
sized the importance of the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination and its re-
quirement that the state prove its case and not rely on confessions. The Court also stressed
the psychologically coercive interrogation techniques often employed by modem police
forces and the effect of isolation and unfamiliar surroundings on an accused in custody. A
statement obtained by such techniques was determined by the Court not to be a product of
the defendant's free choice and hence was a violation of the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion. Thus, to safeguard the fifth amendment privilege the accused must be:
clearly informed that he has the right to remain silent, and that anything he says
will be used against him in court; he must be clearly informed that he has the right
to consult with a lawyer and to have a lawyer with him during interrogation, and
that if he is indigent, a lawyer will be appointed to represent him.
384 U.S. at 437 (syllabus).
106. The Advisory Committee explains, "A less demanding standard would not ade-
quately protect the sixth amendment right." 77 F.R.D. at 599-600. See Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. at 468 ("The Fifth Amendment privilege is so fundamental.., and the expedient
of giving an adequate warning . . . so simple.").
107. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 468.
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trial court would seem a small price to pay for the assurance that the de-
fendant is aware of his rights. As Chief Justice Warren wrote in Miranda,
"only through such a warning is there ascertainable assurance that the ac-
cused was aware of this right."'' 0
8
Further, just as the Miranda court was concerned with the intimidating
surroundings of custodial interrogation, so too are the circumstances of
multiple representation often intimidating to the defendant. For example,
codefendants who are anxious to retain the loyalty of confederates may
exert various forms of threat and coercion to prevent the accused from
giving damaging testimony against them. Justice White recognized such a
possibility in his dissent to Miranda when he wrote, "the lawyer who ar-
rives [to represent the defendant] may also be the lawyer for the defend-
ant's colleagues and can be relied upon to insure that no breach of the
organization's security takes place even though the accused may feel that
the best thing he can do is to cooperate [with the authorities].'" 9 The
intimidated defendant finds little solace in the judicial system with which
he is unfamiliar and which he regards as an even greater danger than his
codefendants. In such a situation, an explanation to the defendant of the
possibility of a conflict of interest, of its possible effects on his representa-
tion, and of his right to effective counsel might demonstrate to the accused
that the judicial system presents a lesser danger, removing at least some of
the intimidation. Moreover, a proper warning might create incentives for
defendants to request separate counsel, perhaps diminishing their loyalty
to confederates and producing testimony useful to the prosecution and
helpful to themselves."'
Finally, a Rule 44(c) inquiry requirement, like Miranda warnings, pro-
vides assurance that a defendant will not unwittingly forego his constitu-
tional rights. The fundamental guarantees of the Constitution, such as the
fifth and sixth amendments, are of such importance that a trial court
should not assume from a defendant's silence that he is aware of his rights
and knowingly waives them. A defendant who does not exercise his rights
108. Id at 472.
109. Id. at 544. Justice White was referring to cases involving "organized crime."
110. An often repeated objection to Miranda is that in protecting the fifth amendment
right of the suspect the Court ignored the rights and interest of society in punishing
criminals and preventing crime. Assuming this criticism is valid, Rule 44 arguably helps to
correct the problem: a Rule 44(c) inquiry may help seal convictions against collateral attack
and help keep justly convicted criminals in jail. Additionally, rather than discourage confes-
sions, a Rule 44(c) inquiry would encourage defendants to retain separate counsel, who may
be more likely to inquire into grants of immunity in exchange for a confession and guilty
plea. Thus a Rule 44(c) inquiry may advance justice by removing impediments to the de-
fendant's testimony against co-conspirators.
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because he is unaware of them may need conflict-free counsel the most."'
Although in cases of multiple representation, the defendant's attorney is
charged with care of his client's rights, it is not sufficient to rely upon coun-
sel alone to ensure that each defendant has made an effective waiver. The
conflicts are often difficult to discern, and the attorney may not be wholly
disinterested." 2 Only through an inquiry such as that mandated by Rule
44(c) can the court be assured that the defendant is aware of his right to
conflict-free representation. As Justice Brennan noted in his concurrence
in Sullivan, "[t]he court cannot delay until a defendant or an attorney
raises a problem, for the Constitution also protects defendants whose attor-
neys fail to consider, or choose to ignore potential conflict problems.""'l '
As the Supreme Court implies by its endorsement of Rule 44(c), its ration-
ale and its basis in precedent are very persuasive. The rule provides an
acceptable solution to the problems inherent in multiple representation
and is certainly preferrable to most state court procedures where, after Sul-
livan, the trial judge may simply assume, absent objection, that no conflict
exists in cases of joint representation. Also, Rule 44(c) is not novel or un-
workable, but is, like Miranda warnings, a simple procedural device for
protecting fundamental constitutional rights.
V. CONCLUSION
In Cuyler v. Sullivan, the Court rejected strong arguments favoring a
constitutionally mandated duty to inquire into possible conflicts of interest
in all cases of multiple representation. In so doing, the Court declined an
opportunity to extend sixth amendment protection to individuals poten-
tially prejudiced by ineffective assistance of counsel arising from the con-
flicting interests of codefendants. Although the Court did implicitly
endorse the duty to inquire by commending the effect of proposed Rule
44(c) for federal courts, it failed to give this endorsement constitutional
underpinnings. The Court, therefore, left defendants in state court without
similar protection and, thus, at the mercy either of their own legal naivete
Ill. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 470-71.
112. United States v. Lawriw, 568 F.2d 98, 104 (8th Cir. 1977). The Court in Lawriw
affirmed the conviction of a jointly represented defendant who claimed ineffective assistance
of counsel as a result of a conflict of interest. Though it did not require an inquiry, the
Court found that before waiver of conflict-free representation could be found to be knowing
and intelligent, an inquiry must be made by the trial court. Such an inquiry was made in
Lawriw and the Court found the defendant had made a voluntary and intelligent waiver and
could not later complain of a conflict of interest in her representation See also United States
v Martorano, 610 F.2d 36, 40 (1st Cir. 1979); United States v. Garcia, 517 F.2d 272, 278 (5th
Cir. 1975). But see United States v. Steele, 576 F.2d 111, 112 .(6th Cir. 1978).
113. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 100 S. Ct. at 1719 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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or of the ethical judgments of their defense attorneys. Since the Court has
shown that constitutional claims will be unavailing, relief can and should
come through adoption of rules similar to 44(c) by state courts or similar
enactments by state legislatures.
Jay du Von

